2010: It Was a Very Good Year…To Die--Or Was It? by Medlin, S. Alan et al.
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Law School
Winter 2011
2010: It Was a Very Good Year…To Die--Or Was
It?
S. Alan Medlin
University of South Carolina - Columbia, medlinsa@law.sc.edu
F. Ladson Boyle
University of South Carolina - Columbia, lad@boyleslaw.net
Howard M. Zaritsky
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
S. Alan Medlin, F. Ladson Boyle and Howard M. Zaritsky, 2010: It Was a Very Good Year…To Die-- Or Was It?, 45 Real Prop., Tr. & Est.
L. J. 589 (2011).
2010: IT WAS A VERY GOOD YEAR ...
TO DIE-OR WAS IT?
S. Alan Medlin,' F. Ladson Boyle," & Howard M. Zaritsky"'
Editors' Synopsis: On December 17, 2010, Congress reinstated the estate
tax and the generation skipping transfer tax, with changes from the prior
tax regime. Estates ofdecedents dying in 2010, before the reinstatementof
those transfer taxes, have a choice: apply the new tax regime or elect out.
This Article discusses some of the tax factors affecting this choice. In
addition to the tax issues for these decedents, the lack of any estate or
generation skipping transfer tax at the time of their deaths could cause
document construction problems that impact the allocation oftheir estates
among beneficiaries. This Article examines the construction problems and
proposes disclaimers and family settlement agreements as possible
solutions in certain cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Congressional action and inaction affected decedents dying in 2010.
The so-called repeal of the estate and generation skipping transfer (GST)
taxes in 20011 was actually a stepped increase in the amount of property
that could pass free of estate and GST taxes through 2009.2 The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) allowed de-
cedents dying in 2010 (hiatus decedents) to transfer property free from es-
tate and GST taxes but restored both taxes in 2011 with rather limited
protection-the applicable exclusion amount dropped to $1 million, which
also lowered the GST exemption to $1 million indexed for inflation since
1997.
After 2001, many estate planners initially expected Congress to perma-
nently repeal the estate and GST tax regime but, as 2010 approached, re-
vised their expectations to anticipate that, before 2010, Congress would
impose some type of estate and GST tax for hiatus decedents. Neither oc-
curred, and the estates of hiatus decedents seemingly could escape estate
and GST taxes.
Nevertheless, during 2010, estate planners conjectured that Congress
still might enact a new estate and GST tax regime and retroactively apply it.
Estate planning was in flux because of the uncertainty. On December 17,
1 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38.
2 EGTRRA incrementally raised the estate tax exemption amount from $675,000 in
2001 up to $3.5 million in 2009. See § 521, 115 Stat. at 71-72. The amount free of gift taxes
rose to $1 million under EGTRRA but did not increase thereafter because it was de-coupled
from the estate tax. See id. In 2011, under EGTRRA, the gift tax exemption equivalent
would have remained at $1 million. See id.
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2010, Congress enacted retroactive estate and GST tax legislation (2010
Tax Act), but the impact of the retroactive change on hiatus decedents was
eased somewhat because the legislation allowed estates of hiatus decedents
to elect out of the retroactive estate and GST taxes but with possible income
4tax basis consequences.
Both the congressional failure to impose estate and GST taxes for 2010
before 2010 and the enactment of the retroactive estate and GST taxes in
December 2010 create issues and problems for estates of hiatus decedents.5
Fiduciaries charged with administering the estates of hiatus decedents will
feel these problems most severely.
A. Election Out Problems
The 2010 Tax Act creates an "estate tax regime," which broadly
changes the estate, gift, and GST tax rules for 2010, 2011, and 2012 and
permits the 2001 law to resurface in 2013. Effective January 1, 2010, sec-
tion 301 of the 2010 Tax Act reinstates the estate tax and the date of death,
fair market value basis rules.6 The estate tax regime reinstates the estate tax
retroactively with a full $5 million applicable exclusion amount7 and a 35%
top tax rate that, because it applies to all estates above $500,000, creates a
flat 35% estate tax rate above the basic exclusion amount.8 The estate tax
regime also reinstates the GST tax retroactively with a $5 million exemp-
tion and a top tax rate of 35%.
3 See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
4 The tax regime of the 2010 Tax Act lasts for two years. See § 101, 124 Stat. at 3298.
Thus, estate planning remains in flux. The title of the portion of the 2010 Tax Act applicable
to transfer taxes is entitled, perhaps ominously for long-term estate planning, "Title III:
Temporary Estate Tax Relief." Tit. III, 124 Stat. at 3300. Much has been and presumably
will be written about the tax planning issues stemming from the 2010 Tax Act. See, e.g.,
HOWARD M. ZARJTSKY, PRACfiCAL ESTATE PLANNING IN 2011 AND 2012 (Thomson
Reuters/WG&L, 2011).
5 Estate planning is still in flux because the 2010 Tax Act's provisions continue only
through 2012, but this Article focuses on the problems relevant to the estates of decedents
dying in 2010. See § 101, 124 Stat. at 3298.
6 See § 301, 124 Stat. at 3300.
For decedents survived by a spouse, the 2010 Tax Act now defines "applicable
exclusion amount," a term coined by EGTRRA, as the basic exclusion amount ($5 million)
plus any unused basic exclusion amount ported from the deceased spouse's estate to the
surviving spouse. See § 303, 124 Stat. at 3302-04.
8 See § 302(a), 124 Stat. at 3301.
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Two important and time-sensitive issues relate to estates of hiatus dece-
dents. First, construing tax-sensitive language in wills and revocable trusts
may be problematic because estate or GST taxes may not have been appli-
cable to the decedent's estate on the date of the decedent's death. This con-
struction problem may directly affect the disposition of the decedent's
property among the various beneficiaries.
Second, the personal representative of the estate of a hiatus decedent
must choose whether to allow the estate to be taxed under the estate tax re-
gime (with a 35% rate, a $5 million applicable exclusion amount, a $5 mil-
lion GST exemption, and an income tax basis in the decedent's assets equal
to their fair market value on the date of death) or elect out of the estate tax
and into the carryover basis regime (with no estate tax, a modified carryover
basis for income tax purposes, and a $5 million GST exemption but no GST
tax on 2010 GST taxable transfers).
B. Hiatus Construction Problems
For certain hiatus decedents, including those who died after the Decem-
ber 17, 2010 effective date of the 2010 Tax Act, construction problems may
exist. Many wills and revocable trusts drafted to be estate-tax sensitive di-
vided a decedent's estate or revocable trust between a surviving spouse or a
trust for a surviving spouse (hereinafter collectively described as a gift to a
surviving spouse) and a gift to other family members or a trust for family
members (hereinafter collectively described as a gift to a credit shelter
trust). A division between beneficiaries also may exist based on the applica-
ble GST exclusion.
The controlling document often defines the division between the surviv-
ing spouse and the credit-shelter trust by a formula that uses estate or GST
tax terms. 9 Such a formula might, for example, give to the credit-shelter
"the maximum amount of the decedent's estate that may pass free of estate
taxes." Alternatively, the formula might give the surviving spouse an
amount equal to the optimal marital deduction less the credit-shelter
amount-all of the estate reduced by the greatest amount of property that
can pass to others free of federal estate taxes. When these formulas use
terms that refer to federal estate taxes, such as the unified credit, the appli-
cable credit amount, the applicable exclusion amount, the exemption equiv-
alent, the optimal marital deduction, the maximum marital deduction, or the
GST exclusion, the division of the property of the decedent's estate or re-
9 For an extensive discussion of marital formulas, see RICHARD B. COVEY, MARITAL
DEDUCTION AND CREDIT SHELTER DISPOSITIONS AND THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS (3d
ed. 1984); Jeffrey N. Pennell, 843-2d T.M., Estate Tax Marital Deduction.
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vocable trust becomes problematic because these terms had no meaning in
2010 until December 17.10
For several reasons, these construction problems remain despite the
2010 Tax Act. First, the usual rule for construing a testator's intention ap-
plies the law in effect at the date of death: the testator speaks through the
will at the time of death and presumably knows the facts and law applicable
at that time." If the will or revocable trust of a 2010 decedent 2 contained
tax-sensitive terms but no express provisions about allocating the estate if
no estate or GST taxes existed at the time of death, then the retroactive ap-
plication of the 2010 Tax Act arguably should not cure property allocation
construction issues because no estate or GST taxes existed at the time of
death.' 3 This position is buttressed by the ability of a 2010 decedent's estate
to opt out of the 2010 Tax Act's retroactive tax regime. 14 Thus, for state law
construction purposes, a court may construe the decedent's will or trust,
speaking at the time of the decedent's death, to contain meaningless terms.
A federal enactment that retroactively applies tax law does not necessarily
retroactively affect state law construction issues; beneficiaries may still ar-
gue about the meaning of the tax-based formulas in the will or trust. More-
over, it is not uncommon for tax-sensitive wills and trusts to define tax
terms by referring to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect at the time
of the decedent's death. One might argue the division of the decedent's
property is based on the tax meaning of the formula even though the estate
elected out and the decedent died after December 17, 2010.
10See also infra Part IE.A.
See, e.g., In re Medeiros Testamentary Trust and Life Ins. Trust, 96 P.3d 1098, 1105
(Haw. 2004) ("A will speaks from the time of testator's death, and that what is spoken is
subject to the laws in force at that time." (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Estate of
Christian, 652 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Haw. 1982)); In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299
(Tenn. 2005); Schilling v. Schilling, 695 S.E.2d 181 (Va. 2010).
12 This analysis assumes that the decedent died before the enactment date of the 2010
Tax Act, which was December 17, 2010.
13 Even if the retroactive effect of the 2010 Tax Act could be construed to result in a
determination that an estate tax was in effect on the date of death of a 2010 decedent, the tax-
related terms might make no sense. For example, the 2010 Tax Act uses the term "basic
exclusion amount" in some situations, in lieu of EGTRRA's "applicable exclusion amount."
See, e.g., Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 303, 124 Stat. 3296, 3303. The pertinent language in the
document would rely on EGTRRA terms, which might not translate readily to the terms in
the 2010 Tax Act.
14 See infra Part II.
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Second, the hiatus construction problem clearly exists for estates of
2010 decedents whose personal representatives elect out of the retroactive
estate tax. By choice, these estates are not subject to any estate tax regime at
the date of death. Third, some documents contain alternative dispositive
provisions based on whether the estate is subject to estate or GST tax.
II. REPEAL OF 2010 REPEAL WITH AN ELECTION OUT
The 2010 Tax Act gives the personal representative of a 2010 dece-
dent's estate the power to elect out of the estate tax regime and into the car-
ryover basis regime.' 5 If the personal representative does not make an
election, the estate will be subject to the estate tax regime.16
Some thought this election was a political necessity because some es-
tates had planned based on the legislative promise that no estate tax would
be levied in 2010.'1 Some also believed that one or more of the estates of
several billionaires who died in 2010 would strongly litigate any attempt to
retroactively reinstate the estate tax, unless an election out of the estate tax
was included. Such litigation would likely result in a victory by the gov-
ernment but leave the state of the estate tax uncertain for many years while
the case made its way through the courts.' 8
For some estates with very clear governing instruments (or no govern-
ing instrument), total assets well below $5 million, no lifetime post-1976
taxable gifts, and no interspousal transfers to the decedent within the year
ending on the date of death, the personal representative may have little rea-
son to consider electing out of the estate tax. The basis adjustments under
section 1014,19 which gives the assets of the estate an adjusted basis equal
to their estate tax value and thereby eliminates any built-in taxable gains,
will provide favorable income tax treatment for the estate assets without any
offsetting unfavorable estate tax treatment.20 For other estates, however, this
15 See § 301(c), 124 Stat. at 3300.
16 See id.
17 Some believe this planning included the postponement of certifiable death until 2010
by the continued use of extraordinary life-prolonging measures.
18 Wealthy decedents dying in 2010 included New York Yankees owner George
Steinbrenner, Texas oil pipeline tycoon Dan Duncan, textile magnate Roger Milliken
(although he died after the enactment of the 2010 Tax Act), and media magnate John Kluge.
See I.R.C. § 1014.
20 Even for estates under $5 million, however, situations may arise in which the election
out of the estate tax will be logical. For example, the personal representative of a decedent
who executed a 2000 will leaving his children the maximum amount that could pass free of
estate taxes and who had not changed it thereafter, whether due to disability, laziness, or
594
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election may create difficult tax and nontax choices, and generate substan-
tial amounts of potentially very hostile litigation.
A. Factors in Electing Out of the Estate Tax
The decision whether to elect out of the estate tax regime and into the
modified carryover basis regime will often be difficult. The personal repre-
sentative must calculate the estate taxes that would be due if no election is
made and which beneficial shares will bear the taxes, and then calculate the
income taxes that will be due if the election is made and the beneficial
shares that will bear these taxes. Projecting the tax effects of the modified
carryover basis rules requires calculation of the net appreciation in each as-
set, the character of the gain on the sale of each asset, the tax rate applicable
to the gain on the sale of each asset, when each asset is likely to be sold and
whether tax benefits exist that might reduce the tax on such sales, and how
the modified carryover basis rules will apply to these assets. The relevant
factors that the personal representative should consider combine the issues
of the income tax consequences of carryover basis,2 ' possible GST taxes,
possible estate taxes, a weighted comparison of potential income and estate
taxes, and other related factors such as passive losses and partnership inter-
ests.22
B. Fiduciary Responsibilities
The personal representative of an estate owes both a duty of fairness
and impartiality towards all of the beneficiaries of the estate and a duty to
conserve the estate, including a duty to minimize taxes. 23 These duties gen-
uncertainty, and whose estate was $5 million, would find that the $5 million basic exclusion
amount applicable to estates of 2010 decedents entirely disinherited the surviving spouse.
Electing out of the estate tax might be highly desirable in such a situation. See infra Part
M.A.
21 The uncertainty and complexity of the carryover basis analysis is exacerbated by
complications such as the carryover basis rules generally providing for a basis stepped up to
the date of death fair market value to a limit of $1.3 million, with a $3 million limit for
surviving spouses. See I.R.C. § 1022(b), (c)(1).
22 See ZARITSKY, supra note 4, 1 2.02; Howard M. Zaritsky, Issues for Electing Out of
the Estate Tax for 2010 Decedents, 23 PROB. PRAC. REP. 1 (Feb. 2011).
23 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-703, 3-712 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 138, 160
(1998 & Supp. 2010); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 801, 802,803 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 587,
588, 600 (2006); see also In re Estate of Fogleman, 3 P.3d 1172, (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000),
review denied (finding a duty of fairness and impartiality required by Uniform Probate Code
§§ 3-703 and 3-712); In re Estate ofHedke, 775 N.W.2d 13, (Neb. 2009) (finding a trustee
owes a duty of fairness and impartiality under Uniform Trust Code § 801).
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erally mean that the personal representative must make every effort to min-
imize the total taxes on all the beneficiaries and the estate.
The election not to apply the estate tax regime will, in many cases,
create a conflict between the interests of different beneficiaries and some-
times between the interests of particular beneficiaries and the personal rep-
resentative's duty to conserve estate assets by minimizing taxes. Situations
in which the avoidance of estate taxes benefits a different beneficiary than
the avoidance of income taxes and situations in which conserving the estate
by reducing estate taxes comes at the cost of higher income taxes to the ben-
eficiaries put the personal representative in a very difficult situation. These
conflicts primarily happen in two situations.
At common law and under the terms of many wills and revocable trusts,
estate taxes, like other debts, are the primary responsibility of the residuary
estate.24 Specific gifts bear estate taxes in such estates only if the residue is
insufficient. This treatment reflects the belief that a testator or grantor who
makes a gift at death of a specific sum of money or a specific item of prop-
erty likely wants that gift to pass free of taxes.2 s Thus, the estate taxes are
paid from the residuary estate.
In those cases, the beneficiary of a specific gift of an appreciated asset
does not really benefit by the election out of the estate tax regime, unless
the residuary estate is inadequate to pay the estate taxes. The beneficiary
does, however, bear the burden of the future income taxes on the net ap-
preciation in the assets on the date of death. These beneficiaries, therefore,
may seriously object to an election out of the estate tax regime.
The second situation in which the beneficiaries who bear the income
taxes are likely to differ from those who bear the estate taxes occurs when
the state law or the governing instrument (or both) equitably apportion es-
tate taxes.26 Equitable apportionment means that the shares of the estate that
are eligible for an estate tax deduction receive the benefit of that deduction.
Equitable apportionment typically means that the amounts passing to or in a
qualifying trust for either charity or the surviving spouse do not bear estate
27taxes. Thus, a surviving spouse who is receiving substantially appreciated
24 See, e.g., Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1943); YMCA ofColumbus,
Ohio v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
25 See, e.g., Mazza v. Mazza, 475 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
26 See UNIF. ESTATETAX APPORTIONMENT Acr (amended 2003), 8AU.LA. 196 (Supp.
2010).
27 See I.R.C. § 2207A; UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT Acr (amended 2003),
§ 3(b)(2), 8A U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 2010).
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assets may seriously object to an election out of the estate tax regime, even
though the estate as a whole will benefit substantially from this election.
Another conflict of interest may arise when the decedent's instruments
actually anticipated the possibility of estate and GST tax repeal. The
EGTRRA stated in 2001 that there would be no estate or GST tax in 2010,
which led many practitioners to include alternative dispositions in wills and
revocable trusts executed after 2001, depending on whether the decedent
died in a year in which the estate or GST tax applied to the decedent's es-
tate. These documents may actually leave the estate assets to different bene-
ficiaries, depending upon whether the personal representative elects out of
the estate tax regime.
Of course, the wording of the instrument may also determine whether
an election out of the estate tax regime should be construed as if the dece-
dent died and the estate tax did not apply with respect to the decedent's es-
tate. Practitioners will need to carefully parse the precise wording of the
governing instrument to determine whether an election not to have the es-
tate tax regime apply will cause an alternate disposition to take place,
whether intended or not.
The existence of different dispositions that depend upon whether the
personal representative elects out of the estate tax regime with respect to the
decedent's estate creates a special problem for a family member serving as a
personal representative. The personal representative has a duty of loyalty to
the estate and must put the estate's interests ahead of the personal represen-
tative's personal interests. 28 A personal representative will significantly
benefit by making or refraining from making the election out of the estate
tax regime and should seriously consider either resigning or having a spe-
cial administrator appointed to make this election or refrain from making
it.29
The personal representative facing one of these problems should pre-
pare the most detailed analysis possible of the different tax consequences of
an election out of the estate tax regime, taking into account the myriad fac-
tors that affect the relative importance of estate and income tax liabilities.
The personal representative then should seek the consent of all the estate
beneficiaries to this proposed election (or non-election). If the beneficiaries
will not or cannot agree or if some beneficiaries are minors or incompetent
individuals, the personal representative should consider asking the court that
28 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 165 (1998 & Supp.
2010).
29 See id. § 3-614, 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 130-31 (1998).
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supervises the administration of the estate to approve the proposed election
or non-election. 30 The personal representative should notify all of the bene-
ficiaries, assure that minor or incompetent beneficiaries have a guardian ad
litem appointed, and give each of the beneficiaries a chance to argue their
position before the court.3 ' A court order, if the court will provide one,
should provide the personal representative with good protection against lia-
bility for breach of fiduciary duty.
The fiduciary's conflict of interests may be more serious if a 2010
"patch" statute has been enacted. Many state legislatures became concerned
in 2009 and 2010 that most wills and trusts that included formula clauses
dividing the estate between different beneficiaries-based on such tax terms
as the applicable exclusion amount, the unified credit, the maximum marital
deduction, and the available GST exemption-would be impossible to in-
terpret in 2010 if no estate or GST tax were levied. This led eighteen states
to enact statutes that construe a formula clause in a will or trust of a dece-
dent who dies in 2010 as referring to the estate tax rules in effect on De-
cember 31, 2009. Two other states have statutes that authorize the
fiduciary or beneficiaries to bring an action to construe a will that includes
such clauses.
Opinions may differ on the impact of such statutes on a hiatus dece-
dent's will or trust in light of the 2010 Tax Act. A court may construe the
last sentence of the Virginia statute, which is substantially similar to lan-
30 See, e.g., UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS Act § 2, 12A U.L.A. 6 (2008).
For examples of statutory methods of notifying and binding will and trust
beneficiaries, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 1-401 to 403 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 66-71
(1998 & Supp. 2010); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 301-303 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 466-473
(2006).
32 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3335 (Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1108
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-75 (Supp. 2010); IDAHOCODE ANN. § 15-
1-501 (Supp. 2010); IND. CODE § 30-4-2.1-13 (West, Westlaw through end of 2010 Second
Regular Session); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTs § 11-110 (LexisNexis Supp.2010); MicH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.2723 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2010, No. 383); MINN.STAT. § 524.2-
712 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Second Special Session); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2342.02
(Supp. 2010); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.13 (McKinney Supp. 2011); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-1-1 13 (Supp. 2010); tit. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2801-2803
(West Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-40A-1 1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Regular
Session); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-113 (Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-917
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-62.4 (Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 11.108.080 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2011); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 854.30 (West,
Westlaw through 2009 Act 406).
See FL. STAT. ANN. § 733.1051 (West Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-612
(Supp. 2010).
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guage in seventeen of the other statutes, as rendering the entire statute irrel-
evant in 2010 because the 2010 Tax Act retroactively reinstates estate tax.M
On the other hand, a court may seek to give some meaning to the statute by
holding that it applies if the personal representative elects out of the estate
tax regime.
If these statutes continue to apply after an election out of the estate tax,
a personal representative's election to apply the carryover basis regime
would also create a nonmarital share equal to $3.5 million,35 rather than a
nonmarital share equal to $5 million. Once again, the election by a benefi-
ciary serving as personal representative will raise extensive issues of self-
dealing and self-interest, and any personal representative should either ob-
tain consent of all of the affected beneficiaries or submit the issue for court
approval.
1. Equitable Adjustments
Generally, the courts may require, or at least permit, a personal repre-
sentative to adjust the shares of the various beneficiaries of an estate when
an election clearly works a disproportionate disadvantage. The seminal case
on these equitable adjustments was the 1955 decision In re Warms' Estate,3 6
in which the personal representatives deducted administration expenses on
the estate's fiduciary income tax returns instead of on the estate tax return.
This approach worked to the advantage of the income beneficiaries and to
the detriment of the remainder beneficiaries.
The New York Surrogate's Court held that the personal representatives
should credit the residuary trust with an amount equal to the tax savings that
would have been allocable to such trust had administration expenses been
deducted from principal in computing the estate tax. The court explained:
The tax option which results in a benefit to the income
beneficiary, especially where she is co-executrix, should
not be exercised to the detriment of the remaindermen. The
remainder interest is entitled to the benefits which would
have resulted if the expense with which it is charged had
been deducted on the estate tax return. The question which
would have arisen if the personal representatives had no
option but would have had to deduct from income taxes an
expense otherwise chargeable to principal need not here be
See VA. CODE ANN. § 62-2-612 (Supp. 2010).
Based on the applicable exclusion amount for 2009 under EGTRRA.
36 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
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decided. The court holds that the corpus of the residuary
trust should be credited with the amount which represents
the tax saving which would have been allocable to such
trust had the administration expenses been deducted from
principal in computing the estate tax.37
A myriad of other situations exist that require or allow an equitable adjust-
ment.38 Many of these involve the confluence and conflict of a personal rep-
resentative's duties. 39 For example, the Uniform Principal and Income Act
of 1997 (UPIA)40 specifically authorizes certain equitable adjustments.
From a common law perspective, certain duties of a personal represen-
tative interact to create the potential for an equitable adjustment: (1) the du-
ty of impartiality; (2) the duty of conserving the estate; (3) the duty to ac-
count, including the allocation of principal and income; and (4) the duty to
comply with Subchapter J by reporting estate income for tax purposes.41 By
complying with the duty to save taxes, the personal representative may vi-
olate the duty of impartiality.42 When two or more fiduciary duties conflict
when making certain tax related decisions, the fiduciary may need to con-
sider making an equitable adjustment, either under the common law or the
UPIA.43
UPIA section 506 provides for equitable adjustments for some tax rea-
sons:
(a) A fiduciary may make adjustments between
principal and income to offset the shifting of economic
interests or tax benefits between income beneficiaries and
remainder beneficiaries which arise from:
(1) elections and decisions, other than those described
in subsection (b), that the fiduciary makes from time to
time regarding tax matters;
(2) an income tax or any other tax that is imposed
upon the fiduciary or a beneficiary as a result of a
Id. at 171.
38 See F. Ladson Boyle, Tax Consequences of Equitable Adjustments, 37 S.C. L. REV.
583, 596 (1986).
See id. at 586.
UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr (amended 2008), 7A U.L.A. 96 (Supp. 2010).
See Boyle, supra note 38, at 586.
42 See id.
See id.
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transaction involving or a distribution from the estate or
trust; or
(3) the ownership by an estate or trust of an interest in
an entity whose taxable income, whether or not distributed,
is includable in the taxable income of the estate, trust, or a
beneficiary.
(b) If the amount of an estate tax marital deduction or
charitable contribution deduction is reduced because a
fiduciary deducts an amount paid from principal for
income tax purposes instead of deducting it for estate tax
purposes, and as a result estate taxes paid from principal
are increased and income taxes paid by an estate, trust, or
beneficiary are decreased, each estate, trust, or beneficiary
that benefits from the decrease in income tax shall
reimburse the principal from which the increase in estate
tax is paid. The total reimbursement must equal the
increase in the estate tax to the extent that the principal
used to pay the increase would have qualified for a marital
deduction or charitable contribution deduction but for the
payment. The proportionate share of the reimbursement for
each estate, trust, or beneficiary whose income taxes are
reduced must be the same as its proportionate share of the
total decrease in income tax. An estate or trust shall
reimburse principal from income.
Although an election with respect to a hiatus decedent certainly seems
to fall within the ambit of UPIA section 506(a)(1) regarding an election or
decision affecting a tax matter, the language of section 506(a)(1) also re-
quires that the election involve a shifting of benefits between income bene-
ficiaries and remaindermen. Granted, a hiatus election out of the estate tax
may disparately affect income and remainder beneficiaries but perhaps not
in the way intended by the UPIA. For example, a hiatus election may shift
tax consequences between a marital share and a bypass share, with the by-
pass share being a trust with income and remainder beneficiaries. A hiatus
election out may not shift benefits of the bypass trust between income and
remainder beneficiaries and may not, therefore, fall within the intended
scope of UPIA section 506. However, the common law origins of the equi-
table adjustment was to right a wrong. Estate planners should consider
whether a court would extend the doctrine to hiatus problems. Equitable
4 UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr § 506, (amended 2008), 7A U.L.A. 540 (2006).
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adjustments started with Warms, but as other inequities arose as a result of
tax elections and conflicting duties of a personal representative, courts were
willing to order other equitable adjustments.45
The precise types of equitable adjustments required when making or not
making an election out of the estate tax will depend upon the particular facts
and how the individual state's courts construe the equitable adjustment
rules.46 Nonetheless, it is highly likely that some form of equitable adjust-
ment will be appropriate whenever an election affects the interests of differ-
ent beneficiaries in different ways. 47
Failing to make an equitable adjustment may create income and transfer
tax consequences for an estate or a beneficiary. For example, a beneficiary
entitled to an equitable adjustment who fails to assert the right may be con-
sidered to have made a taxable gift to other beneficiaries. 48 Personal repre-
sentatives should, therefore, consider not only direct but possible correlative
tax consequences when considering equitable adjustments.
One argument is that, when not making the election favors one benefi-
ciary over another, the failure to make the election also gives rise to an
equitable adjustment. 49 This theory may have some appeal, but courts gen-
erally have declined to require an equitable adjustment when inaction by a
personal representative results in an inequity.50 Whether the failure to elect
out of the estate tax will be viewed as justifying an equitable adjustment
remains unclear.
C. Taxable Gifts by Interested Personal Representatives
The gift tax broadly defines a taxable gift as every completed transfer
for less than full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth,
regardless of the presence or absence of donative intent, unless a specific
exemption, exclusion, or deduction applies.5 ' A transfer of trust property to
a beneficiary by a trustee who has no beneficial interest and is acting merely
in a fiduciary capacity is not a taxable gift.52
See Boyle, supra note 38.
See id.
See id at 586.
48 See Boyle, supra note 38, at 585.
49 See id at 586 n.70.
50 See id at 596.
51 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b).
52 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1).
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Clearly, a personal representative who is not also a beneficiary of the
estate should not have a personal gift tax problem merely because the per-
sonal representative elects or declines to elect out of the estate tax regime.
The same may not hold true, however, for a personal representative who is
also a beneficiary of an estate and whose decision to elect or not to elect out
of the estate tax reduces the personal representative's interest in the estate.
A court may treat such a personal representative beneficiary as having made
a taxable gift to the beneficiaries whose shares are thereby increased.13
Section 2514 states that a power to appoint property that does not be-
long to one among a class that includes the holder personally is a general
power of appointment, the lapse or exercise of which (in favor of someone
else) is a taxable gift. 54 The gift tax rules do state, however, that a trustee's
administrative powers are not general powers of appointment, even if they
may benefit the trustee personally, as long as the trustee "has no power to
enlarge or shift any of the beneficial interests therein except as an incidental
consequence of the discharge of such fiduciary duties. 55
The question arises, however, whether this exception applies to some of
the situations described above, in which the personal representative's deci-
sion whether to elect out of the estate tax can directly reduce the holder's
interest in an estate. This situation may be more than the mere incidental
consequence of the discharge of the personal representative's fiduciary du-
ties and may raise serious gift tax problems for a beneficiary who is also the
personal representative of a hiatus decedent's estate. In such situations, the
exercise (or non-exercise) of the election out of the estate tax may arguably
be viewed as the equivalent of the exercise, release, or lapse of a general
power of appointment held by the personal representative beneficiary, or the
personal representative beneficiary may be deemed to have transferred a
property interest individually held by the personal representative. Either
analysis could result in significant gift tax liability for the personal repre-
sentative beneficiary. Furthermore, this issue is particularly troubling when
personal representatives must resolve conflicts of interest against them-
selves but doing so will result in gifts.
53 See Boyle, supra note 38, at 604.
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(a).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(b)(1).
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IH. HIATUS CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS
As discussed earlier, state law construction problems arise when a 2010
decedent's estate planning documents are drafted with reference to estate or
GST tax sections or terms.
A. Background
The results of different tax-term-based formulas in documents for es-
tates of hiatus decedents, however, potentially are quite different from what
the decedent might have expected because no estate or GST tax was in ef-
fect at the date of death and the technical tax terms used had no meaning.
For example, a formula that gives the surviving spouse the maximum mari-
tal deduction less the greatest amount that can pass to other family members
free of federal estate taxes seems to leave the surviving spouse nothing be-
cause the entire estate can pass free of estate taxes to other family members;
the cutback provision takes everything away from the surviving spouse.
Whether this result is what the decedent intended is uncertain and demon-
strates the construction issue.
Tax-sensitive formulas are complicated further by collateral provisions
often included in a will or revocable trust, such as the provision that the
marital devise must be satisfied solely with property that qualifies for the
federal estate tax marital deduction. For example, a devise to the bypass
trust of the decedent's applicable exclusion amount and the residue to the
surviving spouse would seem to give the entire estate to the surviving
spouse because there is no applicable exclusion amount in 2010, but if the
will then states that the spouse is to receive only assets that qualify for the
federal estate tax marital deduction, the spouse would seem to receive noth-
ing. In this situation, these formulas arguably do not direct the disposition
of the decedent's property at all because the division is based on tax terms
that have no meaning in 2010 and the residuary estate may, by default, pass
by intestacy.
When a typical preresiduary marital deduction formula arguably leaves
nothing outright to the surviving spouse because the marital deduction de-
vise is reduced by the most that may pass free of estate taxes, the surviving
spouse might contend that the spouse has a right to some portion of the de-
cedent's estate; otherwise, the apparent devise to the spouse becomes mean-
ingless. One canon of will construction is that all parts of a decedent's will
should be given meaning, if possible. 56 The traditional application of con-
struction rules, however, is predicated on the principle that the decedent had
56 See, e.g., Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Bos. v. Joy, 53 N.E.2d 113, 119 (Mass. 1944).
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an intention about a particular issue but did not clearly express it.57 The de-
cedent possibly had an intention about a division of assets during the estate
tax hiatus but failed to express that intent in the documents, but also possi-
ble-and perhaps likely-is that the decedent did not even consider that
possibility. Had the decedent considered the possibility of dying during the
2010 hiatus, the documents would probably express an intent about that
prospect.
Although common law construction principles might apply to resolve
the dilemma,58 and some states have enacted statuteS59 attempting to deal
with the construction problem, court construction might not be a solution.
Proactive solutions, such as disclaimers and family settlement agreements,
in which the beneficiaries determine the effect of the documents, might be
the best course to accomplish a favorable result for a family that is not dis-
putatious.
B. Disclaimers
1. Qualified Disclaimers Overview
With one exception,60 a disclaimer must be valid for tax law and proper-
ty law purposes to accomplish tax benefits.
a. Tax Requirements
For tax purposes, a disclaimer must be "qualified" if the transfer to the
disclaiming party-the disclaimant-is to be ignored for estate and gift tax
purposes. 6 1 The Code requires that a qualified disclaimer be in writing62 and
"signed either by the disclaimant or by the disclaimant's legal representa-
tive." 6 3 To qualify, the disclaimer must be "irrevocable and unqualified,"
and the disclaimed interest must pass to someone other than the disclaimant,
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
(2003); see also, e.g., Estate of Swallen v. Comm'r, 98 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 1996); Fleming v.
First Union Nat'1 Bank, 555 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2001); Pringle v. Houghton, 88 N.W.2d 789
(Iowa 1958); In re Scheyer's Estate, 59 N.W.2d 33 (Mich. 1953); Crockett v. Scott, 284
S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1955).
58 See generally S. Alan Medlin, Howard M. Zaritsky, & F. Ladson Boyle, Construing
Wills and Trusts During the Estate Tax Hiatus in 2010, 36 ACTEC L.J. 273 (2010).
59 See supra note 32; see also Medlin, Zaritsky, & Boyle, supra note 58.
See discussion infra Part m.B. 1.b.
61 See I.R.C. § 2518.
62 See id
63 Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(b).
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unless the disclaimant is the transferor's spouse.6 The disclaimant may not
accept any benefit from the disclaimed interest; the receipt of consideration
for disclaiming an interest is considered an acceptance of benefits that dis-
qualifies the entire disclaimed interest.65
A disclaimant may disclaim part of an interest but only if it is a separate
interest created by the transferor.6 For example, if a decedent creates a trust
giving the disclaimant separate interests in income and principal, the dis-
claimant may disclaim the income interest and retain the principal interest
or vice-versa. If the transferor gave property outright to the disclaimant,
however, the disclaimant could not separate the fee interest into a life estate
and a remainder and disclaim either. Furthermore, a life tenant cannot dis-
claim a certain term of years while retaining the rest of the life estate.67
A disclaimant may disclaim a separate interest if it is severable.68 The
regulations define severable property as that "which, after severance, main-
tains a complete and independent existence," 69 such as shares of corporate
stock.
In addition to the rules regarding disclaimers of income and principal
interests in trust, section 2518 imposes limitations on the ability to disclaim
an interest in trust. A disclaimant cannot disclaim an interest in a specific
trust asset while retaining some other interest in the trust, unless the dis-
claimer results in the removal of the specific asset from the trust.70 Even if
the disclaimer causes the removal of the specific asset from the trust, that
asset cannot pass by alternate means to the disclaimant, unless the disclaim-
ant is the spouse of a deceased transferor.
The disclaimant may, however, disclaim an undivided portion of the
trust, as opposed to a specific asset.72 The regulations define an undivided
portion as "consist[ing] of a fraction or percentage of each and every sub-
Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(a).
65 See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2518-2(a)(4); 25.2518-2(d).
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3.
67 See S. Alan Medlin, An Examination of Disclaimers under UPC Section 2-801, 55
ALB. L. REv. 1233, 1283 (1992).
68 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(ii).
69
70 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2).
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(a)(5).
72 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(b).
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stantial interest or right owned by the disclaimant in such proper-
ty . .. extend[ing] over the entire term of the disclaimant's interest." 73
A qualified disclaimer of a testamentary interest requires that the dis-
claimant make the disclaimer within nine months of the transferor's death
or, if later, nine months after the disclaimant reaches the age of 21 years. 74
Upon the transfer of an interest resulting from the exercise or lapse of a
general power of appointment, the transferee must disclaim within nine
months of the exercise or lapse.75 The transferee of an interest pursuant to
the exercise or lapse of a nongeneral or special power, however, must dis-
76
claim within nine months of the creation of the power.
Section 2518 requires that "the interest passes without any direction" by
the disclaimant.77 However, that section may authorize a qualified disclaim-
er that would not be valid according to state law, or vice-versa-the so-
called transfer disclaimer. For tax purposes, the disclaimant may transfer the
interest to another transferee if that transferee would have taken after a valid
state law disclaimer.7 8 Thus, in contravention of the general rule prohibiting
"direction of the property," the disclaimant may affirmatively transfer an
interest within limitations, yet qualify for tax disclaimer treatment. Whether
a transfer disclaimer is possible depends on the construction of section
2518. A disclaimer need not qualify as a transfer disclaimer if it satisfies
state law. 79 To qualify as a transfer disclaimer, however, the property must
pass to the person who would take if the state law disclaimer were effec-
tive.80 If the state law disclaimer is ineffective-and it must be or the trans-
fer disclaimer would be unnecessary-then determining who would have
received under state law may be problematic.
73 Id.
74 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(1).
75 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3).
76See id.
77 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4).
78 See I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (providing that a transfer will be deemed a qualified
disclaimer if it meets requirements similar to section 2518(b)(2) and (3) and if it "is to a
person . . . who would have received the property" pursuant to a disclaimer that would
qualify under § 2518(b)).
79 For example, under the early common law an intestate interest could not be
disclaimed, but now the tax law permits the transfer of a disclaimed intestate interest to the
next person in the intestacy line. See Hardenberg v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 166 (1951), affd 198
F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8310006 (Nov. 26, 1982).
See Medlin, supra note 67, at 1289-90.
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b. State Law Requirements
For property law purposes, disclaimers may be effectuated by common
law rules or by statute, depending on the jurisdiction.8' The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated
three discrete uniform acts: 82 the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers by Will,
Intestacy or Appointment Act (UDTWIAA), 83 which applied only to testa-
mentary or probate transfers;84 the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers Under
Nontestamentary Instruments Act (UDTNIA), which governed only inter
vivos nontestamentary or nonprobate transfers; 86 and the Uniform Disclaim-
er of Property Interests Act (UDPIA), 87 which combined the other two acts
for states wanting to govern both lifetime and deathtime transfers.88 Each of
these acts contained a provision deferring to the applicable tax requirements
for disclaimants wanting to effectuate a qualified tax disclaimer.89 Although
the Joint Editorial Board (JEB) for the Uniform Probate Code (UPC)" gen-
erally incorporated the UDTWIAA into section 2-801 of the pre-1990 UPC,
the JEB replaced the provisions of UPC section 2-801 with the UDPIA in
1990.9' Importantly, UPC section 2-801 did not defer to tax law, as did the
81 See id, supra note 67, at 1234-39.
8 2 The three uniform acts were originally introduced in 1973 by NCCUSL. See
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
159-68, 202-20 (1973). The amended versions of these acts were approved by NCCUSL in
1978. See 8A U.L.A. 85, 93, 111 (1983).
83 8A U.L.A. 93 (1983). The 1973 version of the UDTWIAA was based substantially
on a proposed act by the Special Committee on Disclaimer Legislation of the American Bar
Association's Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law.
See id. § 1, 8A U.L.A. 96 (1983).
85 See 8A U.L.A. 111 (1983). The 1973 version of the UDTNIA was substantiallybased
upon a proposed act by the Special Committee on Disclaimer Legislation of the American
Bar Association's Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law.
86 See id § 1, 8A U.L.A. 112 (1983).
87 8A U.L.A. 159 (2003).
88 See id § 1, 8A U.L.A. 160-61 (2003).
8 9 See id. § 2(a)-(c), 8A U.L.A. 164 (2003); UNIF. DISCLAIMER OFTRANSFERS BY WILL,
INTESTACY, OR APPOINTMENT AcT § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 99 (1983); UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF
TRANSFERS UNDER NONTESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS ACT § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 115 (1983).
The JEB for the UPC serves as the oversight panel for three groups with substantial
interests in the development and reform of trusts, estates, guardianship, and probate law:
NCCUSL, the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, and the Section of Real
Property, Trust and Estate Law of the American Bar Association.
91 The JEB explained that the replacement of the UDTWIAA by the UDPIA was
consistent with the general theme of other 1990 UPC amendments, which recognized the
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three uniform disclaimer acts. Because significant differences existed be-
tween the property law aspects of UPC section 2-801 and the tax law con-
siderations of Code section 2518, the disclaimant intending a tax qualified
disclaimer generally had to comply with both property and tax law.92
In 2002, NCCUSL replaced UPC section 2-801, as well as the three
disclaimer acts, with the introduction of the UDPIA. 9 3 UDPIA is found at
part 11 of article 2 in the current version of the UPC. NCCUSL describes
UDPIA as "the most comprehensive disclaimer statute ever written" and
intends for the act "to allow every sort of disclaimer.94
To be effective for property law purposes, a disclaimer must satisfy the
applicable law of the pertinent jurisdiction, whether common or statutory
law applies. Different states have different mechanisms for authorizing dis-
claimers, whether by common law rule or by one or more versions of the
various uniform statutes. Although this Article is not intended to provide a
comprehensive treatment of the rules in each jurisdiction, some require-
ments for a valid disclaimer under state law apply generally.
Generally, any person or that person's representative may disclaim.
The representative may be such fiduciaries as the disclaimant's personal
representative, conservator, guardian, or attorney in fact." Absent statutory
authority, some jurisdictions allow a personal representative to disclaim on
behalf of a decedent,97 but some courts have refused to allow disclaimers
pervasive use of "dispositive provisions not contained in wills." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-801
cmt., 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (1998).
Except for a transfer disclaimer. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
93 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 11, cmt. (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 186
(Supp 2010).
Id
95 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATECODE §§ 2-1102(b), 2-1105 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.LA.
188, 190 (Supp. 2010), incorporating UNIF. DISCLAIMER OFPROP. INTERESTS AcT §§ 2(6),5
(amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 164, 166 (2003), and replacing UNIF. PROBATECODE § 2-801,8
pt. 1 U.L.A. 206 (1998).
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1102(4) (amended 2008), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 188
(Supp. 2010), incorporating UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS Acr § 2(4) (amended
2006), 8A U.L.A. 164 (2003), and replacing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
206 (1998).
See, e.g., In re Howe's Estate, 163 A. 234 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1932). A married couple
died in an automobile accident, although the wife survived the husband by a few days. See
id. at 236. The wife's administratrix sought to disclaim her devise from her husband's estate.
See id. The court recognized the ability of a decedent's representative to disclaim on behalf
of the decedent, but the attempt was not timely. See id. at 237-38.
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after death. 98 After the 1990 amendment, section 2-801 remained silent
about a trustee's ability to disclaim an interest on behalf of a trust benefi-
ciary." UDPIA expressly authorizes a trustee to disclaim,'" and case law
precedent also exists.' 0
As with disclaimers for federal tax purposes, state law disclaimers may
be total or partial. Partial-interest disclaimers can disclaim life estates or
income interests in trustl02 as well as remainder or principal interests in
trust. 0 3 For a partial disclaimer to be effective, some courts have required
the interest disclaimed to have its own independent and separate identity.'0
98 See, e.g., Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Rock Island, 185
N.E.2d 890 (111. 1962); see also In re Estate of Morgan, 393 N.E.2d 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979),
aff'd, 411 N.E.2d 213 (111.1980). In Estate ofMorgan, the deceased disclaimant's will poured
over the residue, including property the personal representative attempted todisclaim, intoan
inter vivos trust created by deceased disclaimant. The probate court maintained discretion to
disallow disclaimer by a personal representative, considering not only statutory filing
procedures and common law rights but also the deceased disclaimant's intent as evidenced
by her estate plan.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 206 (1998), replaced by UNIF.
PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 11 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 186-206 (Supp. 2010).
'0See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT §§ 2(4), 2(6), 5(b), 8 (amended
2006), 8A U.L.A. 164, 166, 167 (2003), incorporatedat UNIF. PROBATECODE §§ 2-1102(4),
(6), 2-1105(b), 2-1108 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 188, 190, 198 (Supp. 2010)).
See, e.g., McClintock v. Scahill, 530 N.E.2d 164 (Mass.1988). In McClintock, the
decedent's will left his residuary estate to a revocable trust. The revocable trust provided that
certain assets were to be distributed to a trust for the decedent's grandchildren. After the
decedent's death, one trustee of the grandchildren's trust disclaimed the distribution to
produce an estate tax savings for the decedent's estate. The trustee believed the disclaimer
would ultimately benefit the decedent's grandchildren because it would result in current
estate tax savings, which the decedent's wife intended to pass along to the grandchildren.
Some time thereafter, the Service questioned whether the trustee had the power to make the
disclaimer under local law. See id. at 165. The court determined that the trustee had the
power to disclaim on behalf of the grandchildren's trust. See id. at 166.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1105 (amended 2008), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 190 (Supp.
2010), incorporating UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS Acr § 5 (amended 2006), 8A
U.L.A. 166 (2003), and replacing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 206 (1998).
For common law authorization, see Pate v. Ford, 376 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 1989). The disclaimer
of a life estate or income interest in trust usually raises a related problem: whether the
remainder or principal interest in trust is accelerated.
103 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1105 (amended 2008), 8 pt. I U.L.A. 190 (Supp.
2010), incorporating UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS Act § 5 (amended 2006), 8A
U.L.A. 166 (2003), and replacing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 206 (1998);
see also In re Estate of Page, 274 A.2d 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970).
10See Smith v. Bank of Delaware, 219 A.2d 576 (Del. 1966); Town of Pepperell v.
Whipple, 100 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. 1951); First City Nat'l Bank of Hous. v. Toombs, 431
S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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For example, a disclaimant may not be allowed to divide an income interest
in trust into separate terms, retaining part and disclaiming the rest. 05
State law also may require the disclaimer to occur within a certain time.
The appropriate time period may depend on whether the disclaimed interest
is a present or future interest and whether the disclaimed interest passed at
the transferor's death or during lifetime. UDPIA, however, does not im-
pose a time period.107 The lack of a state law time period does not allow the
disclaimant to avoid the tax law requirement of a timely disclaimer. 08
Even if a state has a disclaimer statute, the statute may not provide the
only method of disclaiming for property law purposes."' Disclaimer stat-
utes may include procedural requirements such as filing and delivery to a
fiduciary."10
2. Hiatus Use of Disclaimers
Disclaimers may be used to obtain a more favorable tax plan under a
document that did not accurately address the disposition of the estate of a
hiatus decedent. Assume, for example, that a decedent's will leaves to a
nonmarital or bypass trust an amount equal to the decedent's applicable ex-
clusion amount and leaves the surviving spouse the rest of the estate. Also,
assume that the surviving spouse's estate would be large enough to incur a
tax upon the surviving spouse's death after 2010. Of course, we do not
know what the applicable exclusion amount will ultimately be, though it is
scheduled to be $5 million for 2011 and 2012."' Because there is no appli-
105 See Smith, 219 A.2d at 577; Toombs, 431 S.W.2d at 407.
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 206 (1998), replaced by
UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 11 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 186-206 (Supp. 2010).
10 See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS AcT § 13 cmt. (amended 2006), 8A
U.L.A. 184 (2003), incorporated at UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1113 (amended 2008), 8 pt. I
U.L.A. 202 (Supp. 2010).
108 See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2); see also supra Part m.B.1.a.
109 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1104 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 189 (Supp.
2010), incorporating UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS AcT § 4 (amended 2006), 8A
U.L.A. 129-30 (2003), and replacing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 206
(1998).
110 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1112 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 201 (Supp.
2010), incorporating UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT § 12 (amended 2006), 8A
U.L.A. 181-82 (2003), and replacing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 206
(1998).
See supra Part I.
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cable exclusion amount in 2010 for a hiatus decedent,'l 2 this formula ap-
pears to leave the entire estate outright to the surviving spouse.
In this situation, the best estate tax result probably would be for the es-
tate to pass to a bypass trust that will not be included in the surviving
spouse's gross estate. The surviving spouse and the other family members
might argue that the will should be construed in this manner because the
instrument did not really reflect an intent that the entire estate pass to the
surviving spouse. It is not clear, however, whether a state court would sus-
tain this construction, using either common law or recently enacted statuto-
ry construction rules." 3 Even if the state court adopted this construction, the
construction may not be accepted by the Service.114
Furthermore, one may argue that the spouse's failure to forcefully de-
mand the right to the entire estate results in a taxable gift under Revenue
Ruling 84-105."' In this ruling, the Service held that a surviving spouse
who failed to assert a right to a fully funded marital devise made a gift to
the estate's residuary beneficiaries at the time the probate court approved
the estate's final accounting.'6 The ruling also held that the failure of the
spouse to object to the underfunding was not a qualified disclaimer by the
surviving spouse because it did not occur within nine months of the dece-
dent's death." 7
In the assumed fact pattern above, if the spouse is a beneficiary of the
bypass trust, any deemed gift by the surviving spouse will also result in the
potential inclusion of the bypass trust in the spouse's estate under section
2036.118 Moreover, because of the potential application of section 2702,"9
the deemed gift by the surviving spouse will likely be valued without sub-
tracting the value of any beneficial interest that the spouse has in the trust.
A better approach would be for the surviving spouse to disclaim all or
part of the marital devise, causing those assets to pass to the beneficiaries
who would have taken the estate had the spouse not survived the decedent.
In this example, the trust may be the bypass or now residuary trust. The op-
112 See supra Part I. The absence of an exclusion assumes the decedent died before
December 17, 2010, or elected out of the estate tax regime.
113 See supra note 32.
114 See infra Part III.C.2.a.
115 1984-2 C.B. 197.
116 See id. at 198.
117 See id.
118 See I.R.C. § 2036.
11 See I.R.C. § 2702.
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eration of section 2518, which treats the transfer as if it had been made di-
rectly from the decedent to the actual recipient (the bypass or residuary
trust), avoids the imposition of a gift tax on the surviving spouse and avoids
treating the spouse as the transferor for purposes of section 2036. 120
Neither a disclaimer nor a court order interpreting the decedent's in-
struments may be necessary if the marital devise was made to a QTIP trust
for the surviving spouse, rather than outright. No QTIP election exists with
respect to estates of hiatus decedents,121 and the assets of the QTIP trust
should not be included in the surviving spouse's gross estate under section
2044.122 Thus, when the terms of the QTIP trust and the bypass trust are
identical during the spouse's lifetime, it does not matter which trust receives
the decedent's assets.
Of course, if the bypass trust has multiple beneficiaries or if the spouse
is not a beneficiary of the bypass trust, a substantial nontax difference can
arise between the probable disposition under the instrument-all to the mar-
ital share-and the disposition that the decedent may have intended-some
funding of the bypass trust. A spouse may choose to disclaim part of the
marital share, even when held in trust, to assure that the other family mem-
bers receive a share of the estate that is sufficient to preserve family harmo-
ny and avoid extensive family litigation.
In many cases, a formula division for a hiatus decedent may result in a
construction leaving the entire estate to someone other than the surviving
spouse. For example, if a will leaves to the decedent's adult children an
amount equal to the most that can pass free from federal estate taxes and the
balance outright to the decedent's surviving spouse, a court may determine,
by common law construction or available statutes,123 that all of the estate
passes to the adult children in 2010. A disclaimer by the decedent's children
of some portion or all of their devise would fund the marital share to the
extent of the disclaimer and without gift tax consequences. Determining
how much to disclaim in favor of the surviving spouse to accomplish the
best tax result may involve guessing what Congress eventually does, or
does not do, with the estate tax after 2012. The family may not want to fund
the marital share beyond the exemption amount, whatever that may even-
tually be, to avoid tax upon the surviving spouse's estate.
120 See I.R.C. § 2518.
121 For estates that elect out of the estate tax, a QTIP election is not available.
122 Section 2044 is not applicable to trusts for which a QTIP election is not made. See
Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1(c).
123 See supra note 32.
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3. Potential Tax Problems
Several common situations may raise problems in establishing that a
surviving spouse's disclaimer is a qualified disclaimer. The most common
problem arises if the surviving spouse has a testamentary special power of
appointment over the trust to which the disclaimed assets will pass. The
regulations state that such a power to direct the disclaimed property will
cause the disclaimer not to be qualified.124 The spouse can, however, dis-
claim the power of appointment at the same time that the spouse disclaims
an interest in the marital devise to assure that the disclaimer is qualified.125
A similar problem can arise if the surviving spouse is a trustee of the
trust to which the disclaimed assets pass. The surviving spouse may not re-
tain, even as a trustee, the power to determine the beneficial enjoyment of
the disclaimed assets. 126 Therefore, the surviving spouse cannot retain the
power to distribute income or principal among a group of beneficiaries, un-
less that power is limited by an ascertainable standard.127 Retention of a
power of invasion, other than a noncumulative power to withdraw no more
than $5,000 or 5% of the trust fund annually or a power limited by an ascer-
tainable standard, may cause the disclaimer not to be qualified.12 8 Of course,
if the power is not limited by an ascertainable standard, any deemed gift by
the spouse is likely to be incomplete for gift tax purposes and includible in
the surviving spouse's gross estate under section 2041.129 When powers
held in a fiduciary capacity are a potential problem, the surviving spouse
can decline to serve as trustee, in addition to making the disclaimer.13 0
4. Other Formula Issues
The use of a disclaimer by the surviving spouse may clarify the amount
passing to a residuary trust, even if the most logical construction is that the
spouse should receive nothing under the instrument. For example, assume
that the decedent leaves to the surviving spouse the minimum amount of
property necessary to reduce the federal estate tax to zero or to the lowest
possible amount. A court would likely interpret this formula as leaving
124 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(5), ex. 4.
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(5), ex. 5.
126 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(2).
127 See id
128 See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-3(d)(3), 25.2518-2(e)(1).
129 See I.R.C. § 2041.
130 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8509092 (Dec. 6, 1984).
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nothing to the surviving spouse, but a disclaimer will confirm what may
seem obvious and avoid the need for a suit to construe the instrument.
A disclaimer may also clarify what appears to be the right result when
the marital devise is based on a formula that gives the spouse the amount of
the maximum marital deduction less the applicable exclusion amount. In
this situation, what passes to the nonmarital trust is less clear because there
is presumably neither a maximum marital deduction nor an applicable ex-
clusion amount for a 2010 decedent. A court could construe this situation as
leaving the spouse nothing. In such situations, the surviving spouse's dis-
claimer of all interests in any marital share also would avoid the need for a
suit to construe the instrument.
The preceding two examples assume that receiving nothing suits the
surviving spouse, or if the residuary devise is to a bypass trust with the sur-
viving spouse as a beneficiary, that it suits the surviving spouse to take only
the interest in the bypass trust. If taking nothing or taking only an interest in
the bypass trust does not suit the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse
may be reluctant to confirm that the spouse is not entitled to any portion of
the decedent's estate. In such situations, other construction rules may be
needed to resolve the ambiguity. 13 1
5. Disclaimers That Do Not Work
When a preresiduary, pecuniary bypass trust formula leaves to the
credit-shelter trust an amount equal to the applicable exclusion amount or
the estate tax exemption equivalent, with the residue passing to the surviv-
ing spouse, a disclaimer by the surviving spouse may not be a viable option
to fund the credit-shelter trust. In this situation, a disclaimer by the spouse
potentially creates an intestacy, with respect to whatever the spouse was
entitled to receive and disclaimed. Further disclaimers by other intestate
takers will not fund the credit-shelter trust either.
In such a circumstance, a disclaimer or a series of disclaimers by sever-
al beneficiaries will not resolve the potential ambiguity. A court construc-
tion action or a family settlement may be necessary to provide certainty in
such a case.132
Another variation to a common pattern presents another problem. For
example, assume that the decedent leaves outright to the decedent's children
the most that may pass free of estate taxes and the residue to a QTIP trust
for the surviving spouse. A disclaimer by the children to fund the QTIP
131 See generally Medlin, Zaritsky, & Boyle, supra note 58.
132 See id.
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trust is not a qualified disclaimer if the children are the remainder benefici-
aries of the QTIP trust, as is common.' 33 The attempted disclaimer is im-
permissibly severing the children's fee interest in the property; effectively,
the children are disclaiming the right to income for the spouse's lifetime and
retaining the remainder in violation of Treasury Regulation section 25.2518-3.
In such cases, the children might need to consider also disclaiming their
interests in the QTIP trust, if they are willing.
6. GST Formulas
Similar construction issues arise when the decedent's estate or revoca-
ble trust is divided between trusts that are exempt from the federal GST tax
and trusts that are not exempt. Formulas are often used for this division
based on the GST exemption amount defined in section 263 1(c). The 2010
hiatus problem seemingly existed for these types of formulas because sec-
tion 2631(c) defined the amount of the GST exemption with reference to the
"applicable exclusion amount under section 2010(c) for such calendar
year."'3" For decedents dying in 2010, there was no applicable exclusion
amount until the 2010 Tax Act.135
The 2010 Tax Act retroactively reinstated the applicable exclusion
amount for 2010, setting the amount at $5 million.136 The GST exemption
also thereby was reinstated retroactively for all of 2010.137 Furthermore, the
GST exemption appears to be available even to a 2010 estate the personal
representative of which elects out of the estate tax.' 38
GST formula devises commonly provide that a trust is to be funded
with an amount equal to the decedent's unused GST exemption. Such a
formula easily could pass nothing to the GST-exempt trust with respect to
the estate of a pre-December 17, 2010 decedent. In such cases, if the bal-
ance of the decedent's estate is given to a marital trust, a disclaimer by the
surviving spouse does not seem to fund the GST trust; rather, such a dis-
claimer likely will create an intestacy.
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2).
I.R.C. § 2631(c).
135 See supra Part I.A.
136 See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-312, § 303, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
138 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 11 ITH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE "TAX RELIEF, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
REAUTHORIZATION, AND JOB CREATION Act OF 2010" SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION BY
THE UNITED STATES SENATE 50 n.53 (Comm. Print 2010).
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If a will or trust of a pre-December 17, 2010 decedent leaves the dece-
dent's children all of the estate in excess of the largest amount that can pass
to a residuary GST-exempt trust, the construction dilemma is even more
difficult. The cutback language may not result in any property passing to the
GST-exempt trust. Moreover, a disclaimer by the children to fund the GST-
exempt trust will not be a qualified disclaimer if the children are benefici-
aries of the GST-exempt trust because the attempted disclaimer would vio-
late the rule that property must pass to someone other than the disclaim-
ant.139 In such cases, the children might need to consider also disclaiming
their interests in the GST-exempt trust.
7. Fractional Share Formulas
Tax sensitive formulas usually may be classified as either pecuniary
formulas or fractional share formulas. A testator may use a pecuniary for-
mula to define the devise to the surviving spouse or the devise to the credit-
shelter trust in terms of a fixed dollar amount. A fractional share formula
that divides the estate or trust between the surviving spouse and the credit-
shelter trust is usually a division of the residue of the decedent's estate or
remainder of the property in the decedent's revocable trust.
The wording of each of the pecuniary formulas discussed above, or sim-
ilar wording, may be useful to define the numerator of a fractional share
division of the decedent's residuary estate or the remainder of the dece-
dent's revocable trust, with the denominator of the fraction being defined as
the residue of the decedent's estate or the remainder of the trust estate for a
revocable trust. In each of the fractional share alternatives, the issue remains
the same, and disclaimers may solve only some of the construction prob-
lems.
8. More Time to Comply
Normally, a disclaimant must make a qualified disclaimer within the
nine-month time period after the decedent's death.'" However, section
301(d) of the 2010 Tax Act extends the time for filing an estate tax return
for the estate of a decedent dying after December 31, 2009, and before the
date of enactment on December 17, 2010.141 The time extension includes
any elections on such returns and any disclaimers of interests in such es-
139 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
1 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(1).
141 See § 301(d), 124 Stat. at 3300.
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tates, until at least nine months after the date of enactment.14 2 Because the
nine month anniversary of the date of enactment falls on a Saturday, the
date to file such returns, elections, and disclaimers is September 19, 2011.
The extension of time to make disclaimers may be a double-edged
sword. The extension gives the disclaimant a significant time to determine
the tax effects of the disclaimer but also gives the disclaimant a significant
time to do something that the Service could perceive as accepting the gift or
bequest and thus would disqualify the disclaimer.
Also, some state laws may require that a disclaimer be made within nine
months of the date of the transfer.14 3 A disclaimant using the federally-
extended time within which to make a disclaimer probably will need to ac-
tually transfer the disclaimed assets to the persons who would have received
the assets if the disclaimer were valid.' Furthermore, fiduciaries may find
themselves unable to take advantage of this additional time to make dis-
claimers because state law will deny them authority to do so.
C. Family Settlement Agreements
If the beneficiaries agree, another way to avoid the risks of an unwel-
come court determination is to reach a family settlement agreement. State
law widely sanctions family settlement agreements, either at common law
or by statute. Courts have noted that avoiding protracted and unnecessary
litigation often supports the settlement of an estate.14 5 Moreover, courts typ-
ically are allowed, but not required, to accept the terms of a family settle-
ment agreement. The tax consequences of these agreements, however, also
deserve attention.
To be effective for property law purposes, a family settlement agree-
ment must satisfy the applicable law of the pertinent jurisdiction, whether
common law or statutory law applies. Although this Article's intent is not to
provide a comprehensive treatment of the rules in each jurisdiction, some
142 See id.
143 See Medlin, supra note 67, at 51; see also supra Part I.B.1.b.
144 See I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3).
See, e.g., Merkel v. Long, 117 N.W.2d 130, 136 (Mich. 1962) ("Harmonious
disposition of the matter... will serve to 'avoid the expense, bitterness of feeling and
disturbance of the orderly pursuits of life which are so often the incidents of lawsuits' as well
as the needless delay of distribution of the corpus of the trust fund."); Detroit Trust Co. v.
Neubauer, 38 N.W.2d 371, 381 (Mich. 1949) ("That it was for the benefit of all parties
interested in the estate, presently or prospectively, to avoid litigation that might perhaps
prove expensive and protracted is obvious.").
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requirements for a valid family settlement agreement apply generally and
are demonstrated by the UPC and the UTC.
1. Family Settlement Agreements Under the UPC and UTC
The UPC recognizes the ability of parties to enter into family settlement
agreements and of courts to approve them. The UPC authorizes two basic
models: a private settlement agreement and a court-approved settlement.
UPC section 3-912 allows parties to enter into a binding private settle-
ment without court approval.' UPC section 3-912 allows fewer than all of
the beneficiaries to enter into a settlement agreement and requires the per-
sonal representative to abide by any agreement. 147 Section 3-912 states:
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing authorities,
competent successors may agree among themselves to alter
the interests, shares, or amounts to which they are entitled
under the will of the decedent, or under the laws of
intestacy, in any way that they provide in a written contract
executed by all who are affected by its provisions. The
personal representative shall abide by the terms of the
agreement subject to his obligation to administer the estate
for the benefit of creditors, to pay all taxes and costs of
administration, and to carry out the responsibilities of his
office for the benefit of any successors of the decedent
who are not parties. Personal representatives of decedents'
estates are not required to see to the performance of trusts
if the trustee thereof is another person who is willing to
accept the trust. Accordingly, trustees of a testamentary
trust are successors for the purposes of this section.
Nothing herein relieves trustees of any duties owed to
beneficiaries of trusts.14 8
Statutes such as UPC section 3-912 that recognize nonjudicial settle-
ment agreements are based on the notion that beneficiaries are free to do
whatever they want with their property once they own it outright. If benefi-
ciaries can transfer property however they want once the property is distrib-
1
4 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-912 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 179 (1998).
See id.
148 Id
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uted to them, then why not allow them to rearrange their eventual owner-
ship interests before the property is distributed to them?' 49
UPC sections 3-1101 and 3-1102 provide a process for court approval.
These sections authorize a court to approve a family settlement agreement if
the court determines there is a good faith controversy and the proposed
agreement is just and reasonable. 150 The good faith controversy requirement
should be met in most-if not all-of the hiatus construction cases. If the
court approves the proposed settlement, it can order the personal representa-
tive to sign the order.' 5 ' Section 3-1101 provides for the consequences of a
court-approved family settlement agreement:
A compromise of any controversy as to admission to
probate of any instrument offered for formal probate as the
will of a decedent, the construction, validity, or effect of
any governing instrument, the rights or interests in the
estate of the decedent, of any successor, or the
administration of the estate, if approved in a formal
proceeding in the Court for that purpose, is binding on all
the parties thereto including those unborn, unascertained or
who could not be located. An approved compromise is
binding even though it may affect a trust or an inalienable
interest. A compromise does not impair the rights of
creditors or of taxing authorities who are not parties to
it.152
Section 3-1102 describes the process for obtaining court approval:
(1) The terms of the compromise shall be set forth in
an agreement in writing which shall be executed by all
competent persons and parents acting for any minor child
having beneficial interests or having claims which will or
may be affected by the compromise. Execution is not
required by any person whose identity cannot be
ascertained or whose whereabouts is unknown and cannot
reasonably be ascertained.
(2) Any interested person, including the personal
representative, if any, or a trustee, then may submit the
'See id. cmt.
150 See id § 3-1102, 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 304-05 (1998).
151 See id
152Id § 3-1101, 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 303 (1998).
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agreement to the Court for its approval and for execution
by the personal representative, the trustee of every affected
testamentary trust, and other fiduciaries and represen-
tatives.
(3) After notice to all interested persons or their
representatives, including the personal representative of
any estate and all affected trustees of trusts, the Court, if it
finds that the contest or controversy is in good faith and
that the effect of the agreement upon the interests of
persons represented by fiduciaries or other representatives
is just and reasonable, shall make an order approving the
agreement and directing all fiduciaries subject to its
jurisdiction to execute the agreement. Minor children
represented only by their parents may be bound only if
their parents join with other competent persons in
execution of the compromise. Upon the making of the
order and the execution of the agreement, all further
disposition of the estate is in accordance with the terms of
the agreement. 53
Court-approved settlement agreements provide the additional benefit of
allowing the beneficiaries to argue that the will, as construed per the settle-
ment, created the desired result all along, so that no gift tax issue arises as it
might with a section 3-912 agreement. As noted by the comment to UPC
section 3-912, "an agreement among successors under this section would
involve transfers by some participants to the extent it changed the pattern of
distribution from that otherwise applicable."15
The UTC similarly recognizes the ability to settle trust construction is-
sues. Section 111 authorizes interested persons to enter into a nonjudicial
settlement if it does not thwart a material purpose of the trust. 55 Section
411 allows a court to approve the modification of a trust upon agreement of
the beneficiaries if the modification is not inconsistent with any material
purpose of the trust.156
In jurisdictions that have adopted a version of the UPC but not the
UTC, a family settlement agreement can nevertheless affect trusts. A tech-
nical amendment was made to UPC sections 3-1101 and 3-1102 in 1993.
153 Id § 3-1102,8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 304-05 (1998).
15 Id § 3-912 cmt., 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 179 (1998).
1 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § Il 1 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 450-51 (2006).
156 See id. § 411, 7C U.L.A. 497-98 (2006).
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The comment to UPC section 3-1101 provides: "1993 technical amend-
ments to this and the following section clarified original intention that the
described procedure would be available to resolve controversies other than
those concerning a will."l 5 7
The 1993 technical amendment makes clear that the intention of the
original UPC sections 3-1101 and 3-1102 was always to include controver-
sies in addition to mere will and trust controversies.
Further, the language of section 3-1102(2) lists a broad class of persons
who are to execute an approved agreement: "the personal representative
. . . , the trustee of every affected testamentary trust, and other fiduciaries
and representatives." 58 Section 3-1102(3) broadly requires notice to, among
others, "all affected trustees of trusts," without any limitation that those af-
fected trusts be testamentary trusts.'59 If section 3-1102 could not affect
inter vivos trusts, then such statutory language would be rendered meaning-
less.
Another issue that may arise with family settlement agreements in-
volves the necessity for the appropriate fiduciary's consent. UPC section 3-
1102 provides that fiduciaries have an opportunity to be heard at a settle-
ment approval hearing but do not have the authority to veto a settlement
presented to the court for approval.'6 Although UPC section 3-1102 recog-
nizes that a fiduciary may be a party to a settlement and even propose its
approval to the court, it provides that the court can direct a fiduciary who is
not a party to the settlement to execute the agreement after it is approved by
the court.161
The comment to UPC section 3-1102 explains why the fiduciary's ap-
proval is not required:
The thrust of the procedure [for approving a
settlement] is to put the authority for initiating settlement
proposals with the persons who have beneficial interests in
the estate, and to prevent executors and testamentary
trustees from vetoing any such proposal. The only reason
for approving a scheme of devolution which differs from
that framed by the testator or the statutes governing
intestacy is to prevent dissipation of the estate in wasteful
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-1101 cmt. (amended 2008), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 303 (1998).
158 Id. § 3-1102(2), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 304 (1998).
159 Id. § 3-1102(3).
See id
161 See id
622
HeinOnline  -- 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 622 2010-2011
It Was a Very Good Year 623
litigation. Because executors and trustees may have an
interest in fees and commissions which they might earn
through efforts to carry out testator's intention, the
judgment of the court is substituted for that of such
fiduciaries in appropriate cases. A controversy which the
court may find to be in good faith, as well as concurrence
of all beneficially interested and competent persons and
parent-representatives provide prerequisites which should
prevent the procedure from being abused. Thus, the
procedure does not threaten the planning of a testator who
plans and drafts with sufficient clarity and completeness to
eliminate the possibility of good faith controversy
concerning the meaning and legality of his plan.162
Thus, because a fiduciary suffers from a conflict of interest from the
possible self-serving goal of incurring additional fees and commissions, the
UPC does not require the consent of the fiduciary.
A recent case demonstrates a judicial explanation of the rationale for
not requiring the consent of a fiduciary. In In re Will ofLiss,163 the testator's
will made devises to ten charities. The successors entered into a private set-
tlement agreement, settling what the court described as complex litiga-
tion.'16 The case involved the state attorney general because some of the
successors were charities.16 5 The state attorney general, after an extensive
review, determined that the settlement was in the best interests of the chari-
ties because of a substantial chance that the charities would lose the will
contest and, thus, their devises.166 The court recognized the danger to the
charities if the will contest were successful: "If this litigation is permitted to
continue, they [the charities] may lose and never receive anything or win
and find that in victory their net recovery is less than what is definitely
available at this time." 67
The personal representative argued that the charitable beneficiaries
were not within the definition of competent successors required by the state
162 Id. § 3-1102 cmt. (emphasis added).
163 445 A.2d 455 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981).
See id. at 457.
165 See id.
166 The court noted that the necessary involvement of the state attorney general "merely
reflects a value judgment made by our society that in matters involving charities the Attorney
General should have the power to intervene as protector of the public interest." Id. at 459.
167 Id. at 460.
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private settlement statute, but the Liss court nevertheless found that the per-
sonal representative lacked standing: "It is equally evident that the personal
representative is not an aggrieved party, and that he has no standing to resist
the interested parties' wish to settle this will contest."' 8 Thus, Liss is con-
sistent with the concern of UPC section 3-1102 about the conflict of interest
of a fiduciary stemming from the issue of fees.
* Liss also addressed other issues relevant to UPC section 3-1102. The
court cited the proper behavior for a fiduciary who was not a party to a set-
tlement agreement among competent successors: "[W]hen faced in a will
contest with an agreement which complies in all respects with N.J.S.A.
3A:2A-81, decedent's personal representatives should abide thereby, or, at
most, in a nonadversarial manner, present the agreement for court approval
if he desires the additional personal protection afforded by N.J.S.A. 3A: 14-
4."169
Citing precedent, the Liss court noted that a court can approve the com-
promise of a will contest despite the objections of the fiduciary.170
The Liss court rejected the personal representative's contention that the
court could not approve the settlement without taking testimony on certain
168 Id at 458 (citing In re Rogers, 83 A.2d 268, 275 (Essex County Ct. 1951)).
169 Id at 459.
170 See id at 458. Just as a fiduciary does not have to consent to a family settlement
agreement, the fiduciary may not have the right to appeal the settlement. See, e.g., FirstNat'1
Bank of Dewitt v. Yancey, 826 S.W.2d 287 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) ("It is a general rule that a
trustee, acting in its representative capacity, cannot by an appeal litigate the conflicting
claims of beneficiaries"); Estate of Fowler, 860 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("The fact
that a personal representative has an individual or personal interest in the estate does not
create standing to appeal solely in his representative capacity. Rather, he must be 'aggrieved'
or adversely affected in his official or representative capacity as opposed to his individual
capacity."); Krause v. Tullo, 835 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) ("[E]xecutor or
administrator as such is not aggrieved or prejudiced by a decree determining the rights of
beneficiaries and hence may not appeal."); In re Savage's Estate, 650 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) ("Even though a personal representative is named as party, he is not entitled to
appeal every judgment pertaining to the estate as an "aggrieved party". To appeal as such, a
personal representative must be adversely affected in his representative capacity as
distinguished from his personal capacity"); In re Estate of Wirebaugh, 616 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992) ("Ordinarily, executor is not aggrieved party[, and, thus, may not appeal
probate court order in his individual capacity] in a proceeding which affects only the rights
of the beneficiaries."); Fried v. Fried, 582 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1989) ("Executor
cannot appeal a judgment which does not prejudice him in his representative capacity");
Boulger v. Evans, 377 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 1978) ("It is a general principal that a fiduciary
may not appeal a judgment which does not affect him prejudicially in his representative
capacity.").
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issues.171 The court found nothing in the statutes that required testimony for
the approval of a settlement.172 The court recognized that, because of the
ongoing complex litigation, the judge had gained appropriate knowledge
about the case.173 "Indeed, it has properly been noted that 'in almost every
case [involving court approval of the settlement of an estate litigation] the
taking of testimony is unnecessary . . . ."'174 The court held that a limited
hearing would not aid the court and that a "plenary hearing is precisely the
event which a settlement is intended to avoid."' 75 The Liss court also noted
that the applicable statute, New Jersey's version of UPC section 3-912 con-
cerning private settlement agreements, required the personal representative
to abide by the terms of the agreement. 7 6
Although the approval of a family settlement agreement may not re-
quire the consent of a fiduciary, a fiduciary who does consent may speak for
the beneficiary of any affected trust and override the objection of the bene-
ficiary. For example, in University of Southern California v. Moran,7 7 a
husband and wife executed a joint revocable trust with pour-over wills and
named an attorney to serve as personal representative and trustee. The trust
provided that, upon the death of the surviving spouse, the trustee would dis-
tribute $50,000 for the care of their dog, $10,000 to each of their named
nieces and nephews, and the remainder to the university.178 Two nephews
threatened to contest the will, and the attorney-trustee entered into a settle-
ment agreement providing for the payment of $175,000 to the nephews. 79
However, the attorney refused to sign the settlement agreement in his capac-
ity as personal representative without probate court approval. 80 Upon re-
ceiving notice of the compromise, the university opposed the motion to
approve it.181 The nephews contended that the university lacked standing to
171 See Liss, 445 A.2d at 459.
172 See id.
173 See id. at 460.
174 Id. (citations omitted).
5 Id.
176See id. at 459.
177 617 S.E.2d 135 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).
178 See id. at 136.
See id. at 137.
180 See id.
181 See id
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contest the compromise, and the trial court agreed.182 The university ap-
pealed.'
Citing the usual rules of statutory construction, the appellate court re-
viewed the state's version of UPC sections 3-1101 and 3-1102.'8 Because
the appellate court was addressing the compromise involving the decedent's
estate, the court had to determine whether the university had a beneficial
interest in light of the lack of a statutory definition.'8 5 The court cited ana-
log state statutory provisions related to the UPC: the definition of devisee,
which is a trustee of a trust receiving a devise and the provision binding the
beneficiaries of a trust when an order is binding on the trustee.186 Moreover,
the appellate court cited policy considerations as support for the nephews'
position.'8 1 If the university's argument was correct, then any beneficiary
could scuttle a family settlement and encourage rather than discourage liti-
gation. Because family settlements are favored under the law, such a
power in a sole beneficiary could undermine the public policy of reducing
family disputes.189
Consequently, the appellate court determined that the better policy was
to allow the trustee to represent the interest of the trust beneficiaries for
purposes of a family settlement. ' The appellate court observed that its rul-
ing did not leave the university without a voice.191 Although the university
did not have a beneficial interest for purposes of executing the compromise
according to the state's version of UPC section 3-1102, it was an interested
person entitled to notice of the petition to approve the compromise and to
voice its objection in court, which could affect the probate court's deci-
sion.19 2 The appellate court affirmed the lower courts.' 93
182 See id
183 See id
184 See id at 138-42.
185 See id at 140.
'
6 See id at 140.
187 See id. at 141.
188 See id.
189 See d
10See id.
191 See id
1
9See id. at 141-42.
See id at 142.
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2. Tax Consequences of a Family Settlement Agreement
Statutes based on UPC section 3-912 or UTC section 111 recognize the
essential concept that beneficiaries are trading their property, or at least
what will soon be their property; therefore the beneficiaries giving up a
larger share may be treated as making a gift.'9 Consequently, the Service
may scrutinize such a private agreement for more than just hiatus issues and
explore whether a gift tax is also due.
The Service may not give much weight to family settlement agreements
that are not approved by a court. For example, in Technical Advice Memo-
randum 201004022,195 the decedent died leaving a will that made several
devises to various individuals, including the decedent's son for life, with the
remainder of each devise passing to a charitable trust that the decedent had
created during life. The decedent, however, neglected to make a residuary
devise. 196
The charitable trust claimed that the residue was omitted by scrivener's
error and that the charitable trust was the residuary beneficiary. 97 The de-
cedent's son claimed that, as intestate heir, he was the residuary benefi-
ciary. 19 8 The son and the charitable trust negotiated for several months and
then agreed to divide the residuary estate.'9 The Service, in technical ad-
vice, stated that the charitable trust lacked an enforceable claim, and there-
fore the amounts passing to it were not passing from the decedent, but rather
from the son.200 Thus, such amounts were not deductible for estate tax pur-
poses. 201 The Service relied primarily on several marital deduction cases
that concluded that payments under a settlement agreement were not de-
ductible unless the spouse had an enforceable right properly interpreted un-
der state law.202 The existence of an adversary contest and a good faith
settlement is not sufficient.20 3 The Service noted that this principle had been
194 See supra Part III.C.1.
195 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 201004022 (Jan. 29, 2010).
196 See id.
197 See id
198 S id
1 9See id
20See id200~ 
201 See id
202 See id
203 See id; see also Estate of Hubert v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 314 (1993), af'd on other
grounds, 63 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1995), af'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 93 (1997);
Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).
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extended to the charitable deduction area in Terre Haute First National
Bank v. United States.20 4
The Service observed that state law presumes that a decedent did not in-
tend an intestacy, but that presumption "is met by an equally potent pre-
sumption that an heir is not to be disinherited except by plain words or
necessary implication." 2 05 Here, too, the Service stated the will was not am-
biguous but merely did not dispose of the residue; therefore, testimony of
the drafter or others should not have been admissible. 20 6 The Service never
suggested that any special weight or deference should be afforded the set-
tlement agreement.
a. Bosch and Family Settlements for Hiatus Decedents
While courts that usually favor family settlements are likely to recog-
nize the special exigency of clarification during the hiatus, these agreements
appear at first blush to raise possible risks under Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch.208 No matter which of the various routes to interpret a hiatus will or
trust is used, any lower state court order, including one approving a family
settlement, is potentially subject to challenge by the Service, unless the
lower court order is appealed to the highest court of a jurisdiction. Such an
209
appeal may be unusual and unlikely in most cases.
Under Bosch, the Service and the federal courts are not required to rec-
ognize a construction by a local court if they believe the construction is not
consistent with the interpretation that would have been rendered by the
highest court in the state. The Service and the federal courts need only give
"proper regard" for the views of the lower courts. For example, a trial court
order construing a will that leaves the decedent's children an amount equal
to the applicable exclusion amount as establishing a $5 million children's
share may be viewed by the Service and the federal courts as incorrect and
as actually constituting a $5 million gift by the surviving spouse. If the
nonmarital share is held in a trust for the spouse and descendants, the assets
204 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 201004022 (citing Terre Haute First Nat'1 Bank v.
United States, No. TH 89-31-C, 1991 WL 496865 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 8, 1991)).
205 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 201004022 (quoting In re Rouse's Estate, 87 A.2d 281,283
(1952)).
206 See id.
27See id.
208 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
209 See In re Paul F. Shur Trust, 222 P.3d 506 (Kan. 2010); In re Estate of Keller, 46
P.3d 1135 (Kan. 2002) (authorizing direct appeal in cases of will or trust construction where
Bosch problems exist).
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deemed given away by the spouse could arguably be includible in the
spouse's gross estate under sections 2036 or 2038.210
Lower court constructions or interpretations of hiatus issues, especially
non-adversarial family settlements, may be more open to Service scrutiny
because of Bosch. When the lower court order is supported by reasonable
evidence-such as testimony of the drafting attorney as to the decedent's
intent, possible correspondence to or from the decedent, and statements
made to independent parties-a challenge by the Service is less likely to
succeed. In the context of actions to determine the decedent's intent con-
cerning how a tax-sensitive formula is to be construed, finding any
precedent is likely impossible. The maxim "No will has a brother or twin" is
often used to indicate that virtually every will construction case is depen-
dent on its unique set of facts because the goal is to determine the intent of
that testator.211
But Bosch might be less of a problem for hiatus family settlements than
might first appear. Bosch concluded that the highest court of New York,
based on existing precedent, would not have affirmed the friendly ruling of
the trial court, but Bosch involved a question of law.212 In that case, Mrs.
Bosch released a general power of appointment to convert it into a special
21
power of appointment. 13After Mr. Bosch's death, his estate sought to have
the trial court nullify the release.214 The trial court obliged, but the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the lower state court was at odds with estab-
lished precedent.2 15
In Bosch, no dispute arose as to the facts, only a dispute as to the legal
effect of the facts. No such legal precedent will exist for construction of
formula provisions: formula construction actions and settlements will de-
termine the decedent's intent, which is a question of fact, not law as was
involved in Bosch.
Presumably, thousands of decedents died in 2010 with documents that
use tax-sensitive formulas in need of construction. Each estate will be
unique as to each decedent's intent, even when similar language is used.
The question will always be one of fact, so Bosch may not present a prob-
lem.
210 See I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038.
211 See, e.g., Bank of Bos. Conn. v. Brewster, 628 A.2d 1354 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992).
212 See Bosch, 387 U.S. 456.
See id. at 458.
214 See id at 459.
215 See id
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The Service may not agree with this conclusion about facts versus law.
In a 1996 action on decision, concerning Estate of Goree v. Commission-
er,2 16 the Chief Counsel's Office stated:
Estate of Bosch does not require the application of an
appellate review standard to factual findings related to
lower state court determinations. Rather, Estate of Bosch
holds that lower state court judgments are not binding on
the Tax Court, including factual determinations, and that
the Tax Court should reconsider such judgments de
novo.2 17
Goree involved disclaimers that the Service contended were not valid
under Alabama state law, although approved by a probate court order. In
reaching its decision, the Tax Court applied the Alabama standard of review
for factual issues: "whether [the probate court's] decision was 'plainly and
palpably erroneous."' 2 18 The action on decision recommended against an
appeal in Goree.21 9 The Chief Counsel was unsure whether "the ultimate
conclusion of the Tax Court would have been altered by the adoption of the
proper standard for review of factual conclusions of the state court." 220
In Estate of O'Neal v. Commissioner,2 2 1 the North Alabama District
Court favorably cited Goree. However, the Fifth Circuit in Delaune v. Unit-
ed StateS222 cited but did not follow the Goree holding concerning the stan-
dard on review by the federal courts.
In Estate of Salter v. Commissioner, 223 the Fifth Circuit considered the
degree a lower court order should be binding. It stated:
While the decree of the Chancery Court is not binding
on this Court, we are entitled to "give it proper regard" In
the absence of a case specifically in point, the best measure
of that "regard", we think, would be to determine, from
21668 T.C.M. (CCH) 123 (1994), action on dec., 1996-01 (Mar. 4, 1996).
217 Id.
218
219 See id
220 Id
221 81 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Ala. 1999), aff'd in part, remanded in part 258 F.3d
1265 (1ith Cir. 2001), on remand 228 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (Bosch issue not
addressed on appeal.).
222 143 F.3d 995 (5th Cir. 1998).
223 545 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1977).
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existing precedent, in our best judgment, whether the
Supreme Court of Mississippi would have affirmed the
Chancellor's decree had there been an appeal." 2 24
The Northern District Court of Alabama in Estate ofMcDonald v. Unit-
ed StateS225 favorably cited and further held that "[under Alabama law, a
reviewing court must affirm the trial court's findings of fact unless those
findings are 'plainly and palpably erroneous."' 2 26 This standard is the same
standard the Tax Court applied in Goree. The district court noted the dis-
tinction between questions of fact and questions of law, concluding that
"when no material facts are disputed and an appeal solely focuses on the
application of the law to the facts the trial court's decision is reviewed de
novo,"227 but a hiatus construction question likely is not a matter of law but
is a question of fact-the decedent's intent. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
McDonald without opinion.228
Thus, for 2010 estates with hiatus construction issues, the Bosch issue
should be resolved on whether the settlement is entirely a question of fact
and what standard the appropriate state supreme court would apply on ap-
peal. The answer to that might vary depending on applicable state law.
Perhaps more problematic for the Service to apply Bosch to a hiatus
family settlement is the question of retroactivity. Bosch involved a taxpay-
er's attempt to have a lower court retroactively interpret the document-that
is, the lower court issued its order in Bosch after the potential taxable
event.229 Mr. Bosch had died before the family sought the surrogate's court
order determining the effect of Mrs. Bosch's partial release of her power of
appointment.2 30 In hiatus settlements, however, the decedent's death was
not a taxable event because there is no estate tax in 2010 if the personal rep-
resentative elects out.23' Instead, the family settlement determines the dispo-
sition of the decedent's property and does not attempt to retroactively alter
the tax result.
224 Id at 500 (citing Estate of Bosch v. Comm'r, 387 U.S. 456 (1967)).
225 302 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (2003).
226 Id at 1289-90 (citing Smith v. Muchia, 854 So.2d 85, 92 (Ala. 2003).
227 Id at 1290 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996)).
228 116 F. App'x 246 (11th Cir. 2004).
229 See Comn'r v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 458-59 (1967).
230 See id.
231 This assumes that the personal representative chose the carryover basis regime. See
supra Part I.A.
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The Service recognized this distinction in Revenue Ruling 73-142.232 I
the ruling, the decedent, during lifetime, held a power over a trust that
would have caused an estate tax inclusion if the decedent held the power at
death.233 However, before the decedent's death, the decedent brought a con-
struction action that ultimately resulted in an extinguishment of the prohib-
ited power.234 This court order was likely in conflict with decisions of the
highest court of the state, according to the ruling.235 Nevertheless, the Ser-
vice concluded that the lower court order was the law of the case and bind-
ing on the parties before the taxable event, and thus binding on the
236Service. As a result, the property was not included in the decedent's es-
tate.
Neither Bosch nor Revenue Ruling 73-142 appear to directly cover the
hiatus situation because the potential taxable event, if one exists, is the
family settlement itself: the settlement has potential gift tax consequences
for the person who does not assert a right to property under the decedent's
will or trust. In Revenue Ruling 84-105,237 the Service ruled that a surviving
spouse made a gift when the spouse did not object to a final accounting of a
decedent's estate when the estate's personal representative proposed to un-
derfund the marital deduction trust. This situation is somewhat similar to
the situation in a hiatus family settlement. The taxable event has not already
occurred nor will it occur in the future, but if a taxable event occurs, it oc-
curs simultaneously with the family settlement. However, a hiatus settle-
ment is different from the facts of Revenue Ruling 84-105 .238 In the ruling,
the amount due to the marital trust clearly was undisputed.239 In a hiatus
family settlement, the agreement resolves the ambiguity of the amount that
should pass to the various beneficiaries under the terms of the decedent's
will or trust. The evidence that supports the settlement should identify the
uncertainty as well as the decedent's probable intent. The fact that the set-
tlement is not attempting to establish a retroactive tax benefit also distin-
guishes hiatus settlements from Technical Advice Memorandum 201004022
discussed above.
232 1973-1 C.B. 405.
233 See id.
234 See id.
235 See id
236 See id.7
237 1984-2 C.B. 197.
238 See id.
239 See id.
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The family settlement should resolve a legitimate ambiguity in all
events. Hiatus family settlements should not be used to redraft the dece-
dent's estate plan to meet the wishes of the family if the result is patently
inconsistent with the wording of the document and the evidence supporting
the settlement. Such a misuse of the process likely will result in a gift under
the theory of Revenue Ruling 84-105.240 If a wholesale alteration of the
document is needed or desired, the participants should look to see if a dis-
claimer or a series of disclaimers can achieve the desired result. A qualified
disclaimer avoids the gift tax issues that arise under Revenue Ruling 84-
105.241 In fact, the ruling notes that the failure to object to the funding of the
marital trust was not a qualified disclaimer because it was done more than
nine months after the decedent's death. 24 2 The Service recognized that qual-
243ified disclaimers can achieve the desired result if timely made.
Consequently, probate lawyers should be careful in using family settle-
ment agreements and friendly trial court orders to resolve interpretative
problems raised by the lack of an estate tax in 2010. If a state court order
produces a result that is not supported by the facts or that is not reasonable,
the Service will have a good argument to treat it as a new series of taxable
transfers for estate and gift tax purposes. For example, if it is unclear
whether a formula clause should result in the entire estate passing to the
240 Most of the relevant cases deal with the Service disallowing deductions foramounts
arising from a settlement with the surviving spouse. The courts have required not only a
good faith settlement, but also that the surviving spouse have a legally enforceable right to a
portion of the estate before the settlement agreement. Without this pre-existing, legally
enforceable right, the Service has disallowed a deduction for settlements. See, e.g., Carpenter
v. Comm'r, 52 F.3d 1266 (4th Cir. 1995) (Because surviving spouse did not have a life estate
with general power of appointment, the terminable interest prohibition precluded the estate
from claiming the marital deduction and did not give the surviving spouse a bona fide claim
that could be settled with the estate.); In re Fung's Estate, 58 Fed. Appx. 328 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Surviving spouse conveyed her residuary interest in favor of a full interest in certain
property, but deduction disallowed because estate failed to adequately value the residuaryof
the estate, therefore not adequately valuing the property that the surviving spouse
surrendered in the settlement.); Davies v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 2d 717 (D. Me. 2000)
(Estate settled with surviving spouse by granting liquidation of an annuity in exchange for
the spouse's elective share rights. Deduction was disallowed because surviving spouse did
not have an enforceable right to the annuity independent of her elective share interest in the
entire estate.); Mergott v. United States, No. Civ. A. 99-1456, 2000 WL 1718723 (D.N.J.
Sept. 19, 2000) (Because the surviving spouse did not elect to receive elective share and the
existence of a trust in spouse's favor was central to the testator's intent, no bona fide legal
claim existed and deduction disallowed.).
241 See supra note 240.
242 See Rev. Rul. 84-105, 1984-2 C.B. 197.
243 See id.
WINTER 2011
HeinOnline  -- 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 633 2010-2011
45 REAL PROPERTY, TRUST AND ESTATE LAW JOURNAL
spouse or the entire estate passing to a nonmarital trust that would pay in-
come to the spouse for life and to pay the remainder to the couple's descen-
dants, the Service could ignore a family settlement agreement that would
result in the entire estate passing to the nonmarital trust. The Service could
treat the funding of that trust as a gift of the entire estate to the trust by the
surviving spouse, with a retained lifetime income interest, resulting in a
large taxable gift of property (and the possible application of section 2702)
that would not even be removed from the spouse's gross estate for future
estate tax purposes because of section 2036. Practitioners, therefore, should
tread carefully when using family settlement agreements in this context.
IV. CONCLUSION
The congressional decision to wait until December 17, 2010, to rein-
state the estate tax not only failed to resolve will and trust construction
problems for decedents who died during 2010 using tax-derived formulas to
dispose of their estates but also created an additional problem for those es-
tates: whether to elect out of the retroactively-imposed estate tax regime.
Because no estate tax existed when those decedents died, or because their
estates chose a no estate tax regime, the tax-language-based dispositivepro-
visions were rendered ambiguous or even meaningless. Determining the
decedent's dispositive intent is consequently problematic.
Courts could resolve the construction problems using common law or
statutory methods. However, for beneficiaries wanting certainty, disclaimers
and family settlements may be the tools of choice. Those beneficiaries must
follow certain rules to effectuate disclaimers or family settlements and
should also consider possible adverse tax consequences resulting from their
choices.
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